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Abstract 
Distributed storage plays an essential role in realizing robust and secure data storage in a network over 
long periods of time. A distributed storage system consists of a data owner machine, multiple storage 
servers and channels to link them. In such a system, secret sharing scheme is widely adopted, in which 
secret data are split into multiple pieces and stored in each server. To reconstruct them, the data owner 
should gather plural pieces. Shamir’s (k, n)-threshold scheme, in which the data are split into n pieces 
(shares) for storage and at least k pieces of them must be gathered for reconstruction, furnishes 
information theoretic security, that is, even if attackers could collect shares of less than the threshold 
k, they cannot get any information about the data, even with unlimited computing power. Behind this 
scenario, however, assumed is that data transmission and authentication must be perfectly secure, 
which is not trivial in practice. Here we propose a totally information theoretically secure distributed 
storage system based on a user-friendly single-password-authenticated secret sharing scheme and 
secure transmission using quantum key distribution, and demonstrate it in the Tokyo metropolitan area 
(≤90km).  
 
 
Introduction 
Nowadays highly confidential data such as personal genetic information are stored in data centers and 
storage area networks. In these systems, information leakage to a system provider and attackers on the 
storage servers is the most likely risk, and when happened, it causes serious damage to data owners. 
Security of such data should be tightly protected not only in storage for a long period of time but also 
in data transmission between the storage servers, which should often be located in distant places for 
robust site diversity. Confidentiality of data in storage is usually guaranteed by encrypting them. Some 
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recent cryptographic schemes enable a data owner to search over encrypted data or process data 
without decryption 1,2. Especially, lattice-based cryptography 3-6 attracts attention due to its resistance 
against quantum algorithms7 and provable security under some worst case hardness assumptions. 
However, evaluation on the security of lattice-based cryptography is an ongoing task. For example, 
NTRU lattice cryptography which has been standardized at IEEE in 20098 is threatened by the newly 
developed efficient attack algorithm9 and needs to be re-evaluated on the security level. 
In contrast, Shamir’s secret sharing (SS) scheme10 can realize information theoretically secure 
storage systems, if data-transmission and authentication in the systems could be performed somehow 
in an information theoretically secure way. Some protocols based on SS further allow processing of 
shared data without reconstruction11. Practical implementations of data-transmission and user 
authentication with information theoretical security (ITS) are, however, not easy at all. The only the 
known way for data-transmission with ITS is to use one-time pad (OTP) with a truly random number 
key stream, which can be shared either by trusted couriers or quantum key distribution (QKD)12. As 
for message and user authentication, the Wegman-Carter scheme13 can be used to ensure ITS, but the 
data owner has to employ pre-shared keys for each storage server, and spend them in the OTP manner. 
It requires frequent key sharing and rigorous key management. So in practice, most data storage 
services adopt an easier way, i.e., password authentication for on-line individual identifications due to 
its high usability. If the data owner registers the same password to all storage servers, attackers who 
can access at least one storage server is able to easily know the password, and then access all the 
storage servers. Even if only hashed password is stored, a powerful malicious insider who can access 
a password file in a storage server may guess the password with an off-line dictionary attack. That is, 
by hashing all possible passwords and comparing with the registered hash value, the malicious insider 
can find out the correct password without making authentication transaction. To attain ITS against the 
malicious insider’s off-line dictionary attacks, different passwords should be used for different storage 
servers at each time. So the data owner has to remember many passwords, and hence often tends to 
reuse a password or employ easy passwords, which introduces the vulnerability against an on-line 
dictionary attack even if the number of attack trials is limited. Although password-authenticated SS 
schemes14,15 based on homomorphic encryption use a single password and have high tolerance even 
against off-line dictionary attacks, they so far offer only computational security16. 
Since critical data which should be securely stored for long periods of time are rapidly increasing, 
demands for an unbreakable distributed storage system ensured by ITS are increasing. If information 
theoretically secure password-authentication protocol could be implemented, it would be beneficial to 
SS schemes. To our best knowledge, however, such a storage system has never been proposed and 
demonstrated so far.  
Here we newly develop and demonstrate an efficient information theoretically secure distributed 
storage system by combining quantum key distribution and password-authenticated secret sharing. In 
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our system, ITS in user authentication can be realized by embedding a single-password authentication 
mechanism into the reconstruction process of an SS scheme, while ITS message authentication is 
ensured by the Wegman-Carter scheme. ITS in data transmission can be realized by using OTP with 
random number key streams supplied from “the QKD platform17”. The whole system operates by the 
interplay between the QKD platform and the application layer on it, in which password-authenticated 
secret sharing is implemented. Moreover, we show how the QKD platform is designed in a layer 
structure for high serviceability and availability of the secure storage system. 
 
Method 
Information-theoretically secure password-authenticated SS scheme 
Our newly proposed password-authenticated secret sharing scheme is based on Shamir's SS scheme. 
In the original Shamir’s SS scheme, secret data D is divided into n pieces of shares 
𝑓𝑓D(𝑎𝑎1),𝑓𝑓D(𝑎𝑎2), … ,𝑓𝑓D(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛), where 𝑓𝑓D is a random polynomial of degree at most 𝑘𝑘 − 1 with a free 
coefficient representing the secret data D itself, and 𝑎𝑎1,𝑎𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 are public values. Then, knowledge 
of any k or more pieces of 𝑓𝑓D(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) makes D easily computable with Lagrange interpolation. For 
example, to determine the free coefficient D in the quadratic function 𝑓𝑓D(𝑥𝑥), at least three shares are 
required because there are three unknown parameters in the quadratic function 𝑓𝑓D(𝑥𝑥). On the other 
hand, knowledge of any 𝑘𝑘 − 1 or fewer pieces of 𝑓𝑓D(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) leaves D completely undetermined (in the 
sense that all its possible values are equally likely). That is, the attacker cannot recover the original 
data from less than the threshold k of shares even by using unlimited computational resources. Such a 
scheme is called (k, n)-threshold scheme. This enables secret calculations (addition and multiplication). 
In fact 𝑓𝑓D(1)(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) + 𝑓𝑓D(2)(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) becomes a share of addition of two secret data 𝐷𝐷(1) and 𝐷𝐷(2). Likewise, 
𝑓𝑓D(1)(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) × 𝑓𝑓D(2)(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) is used as the share of 𝐷𝐷(1) × 𝐷𝐷(2). In multiplying process, however, the degree 
of the polynomial  𝑓𝑓D(1)(𝑥𝑥) × 𝑓𝑓D(2)(𝑥𝑥)  is 2𝑘𝑘 − 2 . So, 2𝑘𝑘 − 1  of shares are necessary to 
reconstruct 𝐷𝐷(1) × 𝐷𝐷(2). 
Now we describe our password-authenticated secret sharing scheme. It comprises three phases: 
(1) Registration phase in which data shares and password shares are computed and stored in the 
storage servers; (2) Pre-computation and communication phase in which each storage server 
generates a random number by a physical random number generator, and computes their shares, as 
well as prepares shares of the data “0” with another random number for confidentiality of the share in 
data reconstruction without changing the value of data share. Then all the storage servers send the 
shares to each other; (3) Data reconstruction phase in which the data owner requests the storage 
servers to send back the data shares using the password (request-response). If the password is correct, 
then the original data is reconstructed.  
In these phases, all communications between the data owner machine and the storage servers and 
among the storage servers are to be OTP-encrypted by the keys supplied from the QKD platform. Thus 
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ITS in data transmission can be ensured.  
As for ITS in user authentication, the mechanism is as follows. The required task is to prevent an 
attacker from collecting knowledge nothing more than obtained by the on-line dictionary attack. In 
our scheme, this is realized by randomizing the responses from the storage servers by masking the 
data shares with the random numbers generated in Pre-computation and communication phase 
which should be discarded at each request-response. Only the correct password can cancel out this 
masking, and any wrong password cannot unmask the secret data. ITS in message authentication is 
ensured by the Wegman-Carter scheme.  
A detailed procedure is exemplified below in the case where there are four storage servers (n = 4) 
denoted as 1, 2, 3, and 4, and we assume that an attacker can corrupt at most one storage server. In this 
case, the secret data D are shared by the (3,4)-threshold scheme. On the other hand, the password 
shares must be generated by using the (2,4)-threshold scheme due to the multiplying process. This 
case suffices the demonstration of the principle of the information theoretically secure distributed 
storage. The schematic is shown in Fig. 1. All calculations are made in a finite Galois field with prime 
order q. The q should be large enough for security, since the number of possible passwords is q at most. 
We take q from Mersenne primes, because they have a suitable form 𝑞𝑞 = 2𝑚𝑚 − 1 for calculations in 
the finite field. In our case, m is chosen in a range of 103-105. 
 
(1) Registration phase  
(1-1) Since each calculation in the finite field with prime order 𝑞𝑞 = 2𝑚𝑚 − 1 can deal with only 
blocks of length at most 𝑚𝑚− 1 bits, secret data D, which has generally a much longer length, 
needs to be divided into pieces of (𝑚𝑚− 1)-bit block, say l pieces; 𝐷𝐷 = 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙|𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙−1|⋯ |𝐷𝐷1. The 
data owner sets a (𝑚𝑚− 1)-bit password P, which should have sufficient entropy against the 
on-line dictionary attack, then computes a message authentication code, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 +
𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙−1𝑃𝑃
𝑙𝑙−1 + ⋯+ 𝐷𝐷1𝑃𝑃, which is denoted as 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙+1, and finally adds it to the data for later 
purpose of message authentication.  
(1-2) For each data block, data shares 𝑓𝑓D𝑖𝑖(1), 𝑓𝑓D𝑖𝑖(2), 𝑓𝑓D𝑖𝑖(3), 𝑓𝑓D𝑖𝑖(4) are created for storage 
server 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, by using polynomial 𝑓𝑓D𝑖𝑖 of degree at most 2, where 𝑖𝑖 =1, … , 𝑙𝑙 + 1. Password shares 𝑓𝑓P(1), 𝑓𝑓P(2), 𝑓𝑓P(3), 𝑓𝑓P(4) are created by using polynomial 
𝑓𝑓P of degree at most 1. 
(1-3) They are then sent to the corresponding storage servers.  
(1-4) Each server stores the set of shares. 
 
(2) Pre-computation and communication phase 
(2-1) Each server generates a random number, denoted as Rj for the j-th storage server, and makes 
its shares 𝑓𝑓R𝑗𝑗(1),𝑓𝑓R𝑗𝑗(2),𝑓𝑓R𝑗𝑗(3),𝑓𝑓R𝑗𝑗(4) by using polynomial  𝑓𝑓R𝑗𝑗  of degree at most 1. 
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Furthermore each server generates shares of the “0” 𝑓𝑓0𝑗𝑗(1),𝑓𝑓0𝑗𝑗(2),𝑓𝑓0𝑗𝑗(3),𝑓𝑓0𝑗𝑗(4) by using 
polynomial 𝑓𝑓0𝑗𝑗  of degree at most 2, such that 𝑓𝑓0𝑗𝑗(0) = 0  should hold so as to keep 
confidentiality of the share in data reconstruction phase without changing the value of the 
data share.  
(2-2) The storage servers send these shares to each other.  
(2-3) Each server receives three shares of three random numbers and three shares of the “0,” and 
stores them together with the ones produced by itself. 
For ITS, the above procedure has to be iterated l+1 times before each data reconstruction of 𝑙𝑙 blocks 
secret data. That is, j-th storage server has to keep 𝑙𝑙 + 1  sets of (𝑓𝑓R1(𝑗𝑗),𝑓𝑓R2(𝑗𝑗),𝑓𝑓R3(𝑗𝑗),𝑓𝑓R4(𝑗𝑗),𝑓𝑓01(𝑗𝑗),𝑓𝑓02(𝑗𝑗),𝑓𝑓03(𝑗𝑗),𝑓𝑓04(𝑗𝑗)).  
 
(3) Data reconstruction phase  
Let 𝑃𝑃′ be the password in the data owner's memory.  
(3-1) The data owner chooses three storage servers among the four. We may assume that they are 
storage server 1, 2, and 3 without loss of generality, denoting them as a set L={1, 2, 3}. 
(3-2) The data owner generates shares of 𝑃𝑃′, 𝑓𝑓P′(1), 𝑓𝑓P′(2), 𝑓𝑓P′(3) by using polynomial 𝑓𝑓P′ of 
degree at most 1.  
(3-3) Each set (𝐿𝐿, 𝑓𝑓P′(𝑗𝑗)) is sent to each corresponding storage server (request). 
(3-4) If |𝐿𝐿| ≠ 3, the request is rejected regarding it as an improper request. Otherwise, for each 
data block, each server, say j-th one, computes 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑓𝑓R1(𝑗𝑗) + 𝑓𝑓R2(𝑗𝑗) + 𝑓𝑓R3(𝑗𝑗), 𝑍𝑍 = 𝑓𝑓01(𝑗𝑗) +
𝑓𝑓02(𝑗𝑗) + 𝑓𝑓03(𝑗𝑗) and  
𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = �𝑓𝑓P(𝑗𝑗)− 𝑓𝑓P′(𝑗𝑗)�𝑅𝑅 +  𝑍𝑍 + 𝑓𝑓D𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗). 
The 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑙𝑙 + 1) are then sent to the data owner (response). Here note that R and Z 
should be discarded at each request-response for ITS.  
(3-5) For each data block, the data owner finds polynomial 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) of degree 2 that satisfies 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) =
𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 for all j. 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(0) is the reconstructed block.  
(3-6) The data owner calculates MAC from 𝐹𝐹1(0), … ,𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙(0) as in the first phase. If 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙+1(0) is 
equal to calculated MAC, the data owner successfully reconstructs the secret data 𝐷𝐷. 
 
In general, the number of servers n and the (expected) maximum number of corrupted servers 
t, can be set arbitrarily provided as 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 2𝑡𝑡 + 1  is met. In such a general case, the degree of 
polynomial 𝑓𝑓P, 𝑓𝑓R𝑗𝑗, and 𝑓𝑓P′ are 𝑡𝑡, while that of 𝑓𝑓D𝑖𝑖 and 𝑓𝑓0𝑗𝑗 are 2𝑡𝑡,, and the number of chosen 
servers |𝐿𝐿| is 2𝑡𝑡 + 1. The number of servers should be set considering with cost and the risk of 
information leakage in each storage server.  
In step (3-5), 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) = �𝑓𝑓P(𝑥𝑥)− 𝑓𝑓P′(𝑥𝑥)�𝑓𝑓R(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑓𝑓0(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑓𝑓D𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) holds. Therefore, if 𝑃𝑃′ = 𝑃𝑃 
(namely 𝑓𝑓P(0) = 𝑓𝑓P′(0)), 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(0) = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  holds. In this way, by using responses from 2𝑡𝑡 + 1 of 𝑛𝑛  
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servers, the data owner decodes the secret data D. On the other hand, the responses do never leak any 
information about D if 𝑃𝑃′ ≠ 𝑃𝑃, since they are masked by 𝑓𝑓R𝑗𝑗 and  𝑓𝑓0𝑗𝑗. More precisely, we can prove 
the following three facts; (i) if 𝑡𝑡 corrupted storage servers jointly try to forge the reconstructed data 
by active attacks on the protocol, the data owner can detect it with probability (1 − 𝑙𝑙/𝑞𝑞) if 𝑃𝑃 is 
chosen randomly, or equivalently the MAC can be forged with the probability of 𝑙𝑙/𝑞𝑞, (ii) the total 
information which 𝑡𝑡 corrupted storage servers can see in the protocol is independent from the data 
owner's password 𝑃𝑃 and stored secret data 𝐷𝐷, if the other servers and the data owner are honest, (iii) 
even if an attacker first corrupts t of storage servers, then participates in Data reconstruction phase 
pretending to be a data owner by utilizing the corrupted servers, the total information which the 
attacker can obtain is no information other than whether the guessed password 𝑃𝑃′ is equal to the 
correct password 𝑃𝑃 or not. Note that a guessed password 𝑃𝑃′ can be uniquely determined from values 
received by honest storage servers, even if the attacker pretends to be a data owner and sends random 
numbers in step (3-3) instead of 𝑓𝑓P′(𝑗𝑗) computed from a certain 𝑃𝑃′. Similar to the normal SS scheme, 
if the number of corrupted servers exceeds 𝑡𝑡 , the confidentiality of the secret data cannot be 
guaranteed.(See Supplemental information for the detail.) 
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of distributed storage with quantum key distribution and password-
authenticated secret sharing scheme. 
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Structure of the whole system 
To realize the scheme described above in a practical form, we adopt a layer architecture consisting of 
two blocks as shown in Fig.2, namely the application layer on which the password-authenticated secret 
sharing scheme is implemented and the QKD platform17 which works as a secure key supply 
infrastructure. The data owner and the storage servers request random number keys to the QKD 
platform in every appropriate phase, and get them in an appropriate file format of key streams. 
The QKD platform further consists of two layers, a quantum layer and a key management layer. 
In the quantum layer, each point-to-point QKD link generates symmetric random number key pairs. 
QKD link consists of transmitter and receiver devices, and two channels connecting them; one is a 
dedicated fiber for transmitting quantum signals, and the other is a public authenticated channel for 
key distillation processing.  
Generated keys are pushed up to servers, called key management agents (KMAs), in the key 
management layer, then stored and managed. Each KMA must be located in a physically protected 
place, referred to as “trusted key relay node”. The KMAs are connected by authenticated channels, 
and execute key relays by key encapsulation in a hop-by-hop fashion. Thus the key pair can be shared 
between two terminal nodes even if they are not directly connected by a QKD link. The KMA resizes 
the key strings into appropriate key files, saves them with key IDs and QKD transmitter/receiver IDs, 
and authenticates the relayed key file and other KMAs in the relay route.  
In the key management layer, a key management server (KMS) is also located at one of the trusted 
key relay nodes, and gathers link information, including bit error rates, key rates, amounts of 
accumulated keys, from the KMAs, and organizes a routing table, and provisions secure paths to the 
KMAs. To make the interface with the application layer, a key supply agent (KSA) is introduced on 
top of each KMA, and supplies a user (the data owner/the storage server) the keys in an appropriate 
format depending on applications, according to the request from the user. The KSA records key IDs, 
users’ and applications’ IDs, and date of key usage, which are also sent to the KMS to guarantee the 
traceability of the key. When stored keys are expired, they are erased. Thus a key life cycles is properly 
managed, and the whole of the QKD platform is centrally controlled by the KMS.   
The data owner and the storage servers can then use information theoretically secure keys in each 
phase. Once supplied with the keys, the responsibility of key management belongs to application users 
themselves. Thus the boundary of responsibility is set between the QKD platform and the application 
layer. Of course, access rights to the QKD platform and storage servers are completely separated.  
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Figure 2. Schematic view of the layer structure of our distributed storage system. 
 
 
 
The whole system consists of two blocks, the application layer and the QKD platform. The QKD platform 
further consists of the two layers, the quantum layer and the key management layer, working as a secure 
key supply infrastructure. The password-authenticated secret sharing scheme is implemented in the 
application layer on which the data owner and the storage servers (STSs) are setup. In the QKD platform, 
the keys are generated in each QKD link in the quantum layer, pushed up to key management agents 
(KMAs) in the key management layer. The KMAs are in the trusted key relay nodes, store the keys, and if 
necessary, relay the keys. To support various applications, key supply agents (KSAs) are introduced at 
each KMA. In the key management layer, a key management server (KMS) is also located and carry out 
the centralized key management. Having requests from the data owner and the storage servers, the KSAs 
supply them the random number key streams. 
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Results 
To test practicality of our system, we measure throughputs of the system on the QKD platform in the 
field environment. We have operated the QKD platform, constructed in a field testbed covering the 
Tokyo metropolitan area (≤90km), named as the Tokyo QKD network. The Tokyo QKD Network 
itself consists of five nodes connected by six QKD links. As inscribed in Fig. 2, NEC Corporation 
provides two QKD links18. In these links, BB8419 protocol with decoy states20,21 are used. The QKD 
link “NEC-1” is made by a 22 km long field installed fiber looped back with the total attenuation rate 
of 13dB. About 95% of this fiber is aerial over poles. The Toshiba QKD link is based on decoy state 
BB84 protocol, and connects the NICT headquarter and Otemachi (very center of Tokyo) through a 
dark fiber of the so-called JGN-X testbed22. Its length is 45 km and the transmission loss is about 
14.5dB. The Gakushuin QKD link uses the Continuous Variable (CV)-QKD23. It is deployed in a link 
of about 2 km in the NICT premise. Another CV-QKD link provided by SeQureNet SARL is also 
deployed in the NICT premises24. The NTT QKD link is based on Differential Phase Shift (DPS)-
QKD, in a loop-back configuration between the NICT headquarter and Otemachi whose length is 
90km with an attenuation rate of 28.6dB25. Superconducting Single Photon Detectors (SSPDs)26 are 
used in this link due to their low dark counts. The quantum efficiencies of SSPDs are 10% at 100 c/s 
of dark count rate. Specifications are listed in table 1.  
The information theoretically secure distributed storage system with (3,4) threshold for secret data 
is physically constructed with four nodes which are denoted as Node 1 to 4 of the QKD platform in 
Fig. 2, and the data owner is located in the same node as “storage server 1” just for experimental 
convenience. Here we should assume that in this node, “storage server 1” may be corrupted by 
attackers but the data owner can be protected against attackers. All the communications between the 
data owner machine and the storage servers and among the storage servers are carried out based on 
the QKD-enhanced Internet protocol (IP)27, in which all IP packets are OTP-encrypted and further 
authenticated with MAC based on Wegman-Carter protocol by using the keys from the QKD platform. 
The maximum payload size of IP frame format is 1500 bytes. 
We prepare three kinds of secret data D whose size is 6955, 13695, and 46000 bytes. We prepare 
Mersenne primes 𝑞𝑞 = 2𝑚𝑚 − 1 with indices m=521, 1279, 2203, 3217, 4253, 10041, 11213, 19937, 
23209, 44497, and 86243. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 3. These results show that our 
system achieves practical processing times. As shown in Fig. 3, performance of our system depends 
on the size of q. This is because (1) the computational time of the shares increases roughly in the 
square of bit length of q and (2) using a smaller prime q increases the number of blocks l, and hence a 
longer processing time is required for dividing/managing the blocks and sending IP packets. There 
would be a good balance point, conditioned on the maximum payload size of 1500 bytes. In our 
experiments, the best performance can be found in the range of q with 11213 ≤ 𝑚𝑚 ≤ 23209. The 
processing time of OTP-encryption of IP packets and calculation of MAC is negligible compared with 
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calculation time of the other processes. The time of total process would be improved by implementing 
a plurality of payloads into a single frame with considering of the maximum payload size of 1500 
bytes. ITS in our distributed storage is more or less realized at the expense of the amount of keys from 
the QKD platform. Actually, the total length of keys required to store and retrieve is about 30 times 
as long as the original secret data. Anyway, we show that the QKD platform works as the stable secure 
key supply infrastructure for requests from multi-users.  
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Table 1. Specification of QKD links 
 Protocol Transmission 
Length (km) Loss (dB) 
NEC-0 BB84 with decoy 50 (Spooled fiber 
NICT premise) 
10 
NEC-1 BB84 with decoy 22 (field installed 95% 
areal line) 
13 
Toshiba BB84 with decoy 45 (field installed 50% 
areal line) 
14.5 
NTT-NICT DPS-QKD 90 (field installed 50% 
areal line) 
28.6 
Gakushuin CV-QKD 2 (NICT premise) 2 
SeQureNet CV-QKD 2 (NICT premise) 2 
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Figure 3. Processing time as a function of index of Mersenne prime for each phase. 
 
Reg : Registration phase (black). Pre : Pre-computation and communications phase (red). Rec : Data 
reconstruction phase (blue). Dependence of numbers of divided blocks on Mersenne prime size is shown 
by green dashed line. The sizes of secret data are, a, 6955 bytes, b, 13695 bytes, and c, 46000 bytes 
respectively. 
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Discussion 
Our newly proposed unbreakable distributed storage system will also be useful to realize secure data 
relay via classical nodes. And, depending on a QKD network topology, we can relax requirements to 
the current trusted key relay node in the QKD network, not resorting to a greatly costly quantum 
repeater paradigm. In the newly proposed data relay scheme, the storage servers are in the distributed 
relay nodes between the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob). Alice sends shares of her data to the 
distributed relay nodes, and Bob reconstructs the data via these relay nodes based on our distributed 
storage scheme. If relay nodes more than the threshold were never corrupted, and the other relay nodes 
could be trusted, then the distributed key relay with ITS could be realized in the sense of the (k, n)-
threshold SS. Moreover, data can be securely stored in the distributed relay nodes, and can be 
downloaded when needed. If Alice and Bob can establish independent QKD links to each distributed 
relay node (embedded in the key relay node), this new data relay scheme could greatly relax the 
assumptions on the key relay nodes in the QKD network, and hence could be a practical option in 
QKD networks which consist of a relatively large number of key relay nodes.  
 
Conclusion 
Thus by combining QKD and newly developed password-authenticated secret sharing scheme, we 
demonstrated, for the first time to our best knowledge, a distributed storage system with information 
theoretically secure data transmission, storage, and authentication in a metropolitan area network. This 
system can also implement secure data relay function. In this newly developed protocol, the 
throughputs enhancement would be necessary. However, such a development issues are made explicit 
by operation in the real QKD network for the first time. Our scheme and system would contribute 
greatly to dealing with highly confidential data, such as state secrets and personal genomic data, in a 
network over long periods of time, furnishing the site diversity as well. 
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Sketch of security proof of password-authenticated secret sharing 
 
The scheme has the following three properties.  
 
Theorem 1   If t corrupted storage servers try together to change the reconstructed data by 
deviating from the protocol, the data owner can detect it with probability of (1 − 𝑙𝑙/𝑞𝑞) if password 
𝑃𝑃 is randomly chosen. 
 
(Proof)   Manipulating 0's shares sent to honest servers in Pre-computation and communication 
phase and the responses sent back to the data owner in Data Reconstruction phase, t corrupted 
storage servers make the data owner reconstruct forged data blocks 𝐹𝐹�𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(0). The probability that 
MAC of forged data blocks (𝐹𝐹�𝑙𝑙 , … ,𝐹𝐹�1) equals to 𝐹𝐹�𝑙𝑙+1 is 𝑙𝑙/𝑞𝑞, because MAC is calculated by using 
an 𝑙𝑙-degree polynomial that has (at most) 𝑙𝑙 solutions. This means that such malicious behavior can 
be detected with probability of (1 − 𝑙𝑙/𝑞𝑞). 
 
Theorem 2   The total information which 𝑡𝑡 corrupted storage servers can see in the protocol is 
independent from the data owner's password 𝑝𝑝 and stored secret data 𝐷𝐷, if the other servers and the 
data owner follow the protocol. 
 
(Proof)  We consider an attacker who corrupts t servers. The information that the attacker can see in 
Registration phase is t shares of password 𝑃𝑃 and secret data 𝐷𝐷, which are generated by using 
t-degree polynomials. Therefore, they are independent from 𝑃𝑃 and 𝐷𝐷 as in Shamir's SS. The 
information that the attacker can see in Pre-computation and communication phase is t shares of 
random numbers and “0” computed by honest servers, which are clearly independent from 𝑃𝑃 and 
𝐷𝐷.  
The information that the attacker can see in Data reconstruction phase is t shares of 𝑃𝑃′. Even if 
𝑃𝑃′ = 𝑃𝑃, the shares are independent from 𝑃𝑃 and 𝐷𝐷.  
Note that this situation does not change even if the corrupted servers send fake shares to honest 
servers. 
 
Theorem 3  Even if an attacker first corrupts t of storage servers, then participates in Data 
reconstruction phase pretending to be a data owner by utilizing the corrupted servers, the total 
information which the attacker can obtain is no information other than whether the guessed password 
P' is equal to the correct password P or not. 
 
(Proof)   Here we describe the proof in the case where there is only one data block. The 
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generalization to the case of multiple data blocks is straightforward. 
We consider an attacker who corrupts at most t servers 𝐶𝐶 = {𝑐𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡} ⊆ {1, … ,𝑛𝑛} and tries to 
get some information on password 𝑃𝑃 and/or secret data 𝐷𝐷 by pretending the data owner in Data 
reconstruction phase. In Data reconstruction phase, the attacker chooses a set of 2𝑡𝑡 + 1 servers, 
L, in which all corrupted servers are included. Then, 𝐻𝐻� = {1, … ,𝑛𝑛} ∖ 𝐶𝐶 is the set of honest servers, 
𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿 ∩ 𝐻𝐻� = {ℎ1, … , ℎ𝑡𝑡+1} is the set of the honest servers that join the request-response process. 
The attacker can obtain all information in the corrupted servers and all information what those 
servers can observe in all phases. Furthermore, the attacker and the corrupted servers 𝐶𝐶 can 
generate messages in arbitrary way and send them to honest servers 𝐻𝐻�. Without loss of generality, 
we assume 𝑐𝑐1 < ⋯ < 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and ℎ1 < ⋯ < ℎ𝑡𝑡+1. 
First, we list up all information the attacker views. In Registration phase, the attacker obtains 
the shares of P and D generated by the data owner using random polynomials 𝑓𝑓P and 𝑓𝑓D of degrees 
at most 𝑡𝑡 and 2𝑡𝑡, respectively. In each Pre-computation and communication phase, the attacker 
obtains the shares of a random number 𝑅𝑅ℎ and “0” generated by honest server h using random 
polynomials 𝑓𝑓Rℎ and 𝑓𝑓0ℎ of degrees at most 𝑡𝑡 and 2𝑡𝑡, respectively. In each Data reconstruction 
phase (3-4), the attacker obtains 𝐹𝐹ℎ as response which is computed by honest server h according to 
the scheme procedure. Thus, the information the attacker views through this attack is as follows:  
𝑉𝑉1 = {𝑓𝑓P(𝑐𝑐) |𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶},
𝑉𝑉2 = {𝑓𝑓D(𝑐𝑐) |𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶},
𝑉𝑉3 = �𝑓𝑓Rℎ(𝑐𝑐) �ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝐻, 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶�,  𝑉𝑉′3 = �𝑓𝑓Rℎ(𝑐𝑐) �ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝐻� ∖ 𝐻𝐻, 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶�
𝑉𝑉4 = �𝑓𝑓0ℎ(𝑐𝑐) �ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝐻, 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶�,  𝑉𝑉′4 = �𝑓𝑓0ℎ(𝑐𝑐) �ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝐻� ∖ 𝐻𝐻, 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶�,
𝑉𝑉5 = {𝐹𝐹ℎ  | ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝐻}.
, 
Clearly, 𝑉𝑉1,𝑉𝑉2 themselves do not leak any information about password 𝑃𝑃 and secret data 𝐷𝐷. Also, 
𝑉𝑉′3,𝑉𝑉′4 give no information to the attacker, because they are not used in Data reconstruction 
phase. On the other hand, 𝑉𝑉3 and 𝑉𝑉4 have the possibility to leak some additional information 
because they are related to the response 𝑉𝑉5 through 𝑓𝑓Rℎ and 𝑓𝑓0ℎ. So, we consider (𝑉𝑉3,𝑉𝑉4,𝑉𝑉5).  
 Let 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐
(ℎ) and 𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐(ℎ) be the values sent from corrupted server c to honest server h as a share of 
random number and “0”, respectively, in Pre-computation and communication phase. Let 𝑃𝑃′(ℎ) 
be the value that the attacker, at the beginning of Data reconstruction phase, sends to honest server 
h as a request. Note that these values may not be determined from polynomials, but there exists a 
unique polynomial 𝑓𝑓P′(𝑥𝑥) of degree 𝑡𝑡 which satisfies 𝑓𝑓P′(ℎ) = 𝑃𝑃′(ℎ) for all ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝐻. Hereafter, 
we show that 𝑉𝑉3,𝑉𝑉4,𝑉𝑉5 has no additional information, unless  𝑃𝑃 ≠ 𝑓𝑓P′(0) holds.  
Each 𝐹𝐹ℎ in 𝑉𝑉5 is computed by honest server h as follows: 
  𝐹𝐹ℎ = �𝑓𝑓P(ℎ)− 𝑃𝑃′(ℎ)��� 𝑓𝑓Rℎ′(ℎ) +
ℎ′∈𝐻𝐻
�𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐
(ℎ)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
� + � 𝑓𝑓0ℎ′(ℎ)
ℎ′∈𝐻𝐻
+ �𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐(ℎ)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
+ 𝑓𝑓D(ℎ). (A.1)  
Defining  
𝛥𝛥ℎ = 𝑓𝑓P(ℎ)− 𝑃𝑃′(ℎ) = 𝑓𝑓P(ℎ)− 𝑓𝑓P′(ℎ), 
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 𝑓𝑓R(𝑥𝑥)  = �𝑓𝑓Rℎ(𝑥𝑥)
ℎ∈𝐻𝐻
= �𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖=0
, 
𝑓𝑓Z(𝑥𝑥) =  �𝑓𝑓0ℎ(𝑥𝑥)
ℎ∈𝐻𝐻
= �𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖=1
, 
Eq. (A.1) is written as 
𝐹𝐹ℎ = 𝛥𝛥ℎ �𝑓𝑓R(ℎ) + �𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐(ℎ)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
�+ 𝑓𝑓Z(ℎ) + �𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐(ℎ)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
+ 𝑓𝑓D(ℎ). 
Then, all values in 𝑉𝑉3,𝑉𝑉4,𝑉𝑉5 are represented by the following linear equation: 
 
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
� 𝑓𝑓Rℎ(𝑐𝑐1)
ℎ∈𝐻𝐻
⋮
� 𝑓𝑓Rℎ(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡)
ℎ∈𝐻𝐻
𝐹𝐹ℎ1
⋮
𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑡𝑡+1
� 𝑓𝑓0ℎ(𝑐𝑐1)
ℎ∈𝐻𝐻
⋮
� 𝑓𝑓0ℎ(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡)
ℎ∈𝐻𝐻 ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
=
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
0
⋮0
𝛥𝛥ℎ1�𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐
(ℎ1)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
+ �𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐(ℎ1)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
+ 𝑓𝑓D(ℎ1)
⋮
𝛥𝛥ℎ𝑡𝑡+1�𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐
(ℎ𝑡𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
+ �𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐(ℎ𝑡𝑡+1) + 𝑓𝑓D(ℎ𝑡𝑡+1)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶0
⋮0 ⎠⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
+ 𝑀𝑀
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
𝜌𝜌0
⋮
𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡
𝑧𝑧1
⋮
𝑧𝑧2𝑡𝑡⎠
⎟⎟
⎞, (A.2)  
where 
𝑀𝑀 = �𝐴𝐴 0𝐸𝐸 𝐾𝐾0 𝐵𝐵�, 
and 
𝐴𝐴 = �1 𝑐𝑐1  𝑐𝑐12 ⋯ 𝑐𝑐1𝑡𝑡⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮1 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡2 ⋯ 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� ,𝐵𝐵 = �𝑐𝑐1 𝑐𝑐1
2 ⋯ 𝑐𝑐1
2𝑡𝑡
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
2 ⋯ 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
2𝑡𝑡
 � , 
𝐸𝐸 = � 𝛥𝛥ℎ1 𝛥𝛥ℎ1ℎ1 𝛥𝛥ℎ1ℎ12 ⋯ 𝛥𝛥ℎ1ℎ1𝑡𝑡⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝛥𝛥ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝛥𝛥ℎ𝑡𝑡+1ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 𝛥𝛥ℎ𝑡𝑡+1ℎ𝑡𝑡+1
2 ⋯ 𝛥𝛥ℎ𝑡𝑡+1ℎ𝑡𝑡+1
𝑡𝑡
� ,𝐾𝐾 = � ℎ1 ℎ12 ⋯ ℎ12𝑡𝑡⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 ℎ𝑡𝑡+1
2 ⋯ ℎ𝑡𝑡+1
2𝑡𝑡
�.  
Because all values (𝜌𝜌0, … ,𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 , 𝑧𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑧2𝑡𝑡) in the last term of Eq. (A.2) are chosen by the honest 
servers, they have uniform distribution. Thus, if the matrix 𝑀𝑀 is nonsingular, then (𝑉𝑉3,𝑉𝑉4,𝑉𝑉5) as a 
whole  has uniform distribution and is independent from 𝛥𝛥ℎ,𝑓𝑓D,𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐(ℎ),𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐(ℎ), and the choice of 𝐶𝐶. 
The non- singularity of 𝑀𝑀 is evaluated as follows.  
   Let 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 be the 𝑖𝑖-th row of the matrix 𝐸𝐸 and 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′ be the matrix obtained by removing the 𝑖𝑖-th 
row from the matrix 𝐾𝐾. Then  det𝑀𝑀 = ��(−1)𝑖𝑖−1 det �𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖� ⋅ det �𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′𝐵𝐵 �� ,𝑡𝑡+1
𝑖𝑖=1
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det �𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖� = Δℎ𝑖𝑖 det � 𝐴𝐴1 ℎ𝑖𝑖 ⋯ ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� = (−1)𝑡𝑡Δℎ𝑖𝑖 ��(𝑐𝑐 − ℎ𝑖𝑖)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
�
⎝
⎜
⎛
� (𝑐𝑐′ − 𝑐𝑐)
𝑐𝑐′>𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐′∈𝐶𝐶 ⎠
⎟
⎞, 
and 
det �𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖′
𝐵𝐵
� = � � ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻𝐻∖{ℎ𝑖𝑖} ���𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶 �� � ��(𝑐𝑐 − ℎ)𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶 �ℎ∈𝐻𝐻∖{ℎ𝑖𝑖} �
 ×
⎝
⎜
⎛
� (𝑐𝑐′ − 𝑐𝑐)
𝑐𝑐′>𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐′∈𝐶𝐶 ⎠
⎟
⎞
⎝
⎜
⎛
� (ℎ′ − ℎ)
ℎ′>ℎ
ℎ,ℎ′∈𝐻𝐻∖{ℎ𝑖𝑖} ⎠
⎟
⎞  .  
By noting  
𝑓𝑓P(0) − 𝑓𝑓P′(0) = � 𝛥𝛥ℎ𝑖𝑖
ℎ𝑖𝑖∈𝐻𝐻
� � ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻𝐻∖{ℎ𝑖𝑖} �� � (ℎ − ℎ𝑖𝑖)ℎ∈𝐻𝐻∖{ℎ𝑖𝑖} �
−1, 
we obtain  
det𝑀𝑀 = (−1)𝑡𝑡 ��𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
�
⎝
⎜
⎛
� (𝑐𝑐′ − 𝑐𝑐)
𝑐𝑐′>𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐′∈𝐶𝐶 ⎠
⎟
⎞
2
����(𝑐𝑐 − ℎ)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
�
ℎ∈𝐻𝐻
�
×
⎝
⎜
⎛
� (ℎ′ − ℎ)
ℎ′>ℎ
ℎ,ℎ′∈𝐻𝐻 ⎠
⎟
⎞
�𝑓𝑓P(0) − 𝑓𝑓P′(0)�.
 
Hence, det𝑀𝑀 ≠ 0 holds if and only if  𝑓𝑓P(0) = 𝑃𝑃 ≠ 𝑓𝑓P′(0). Note that polynomial 𝑓𝑓P′(𝑥𝑥) is 
determined by the values 𝑓𝑓P′(ℎ) = 𝑃𝑃′(ℎ) sent from the attacker to the honest servers as password’s 
shares. So, 𝑓𝑓P′(0) can be considered as a “guessed” password 𝑃𝑃′. Consequently, (𝑉𝑉3,𝑉𝑉4,𝑉𝑉5) has 
no additional information if the guessed password 𝑃𝑃′ is not equal to the registered password 𝑃𝑃. This 
means that, no matter how the attacker acts co-operating with the corrupted servers, it cannot get 
additional information beyond the on-line dictionary attack. 
In this attack model, the attacker is assumed to corrupt the t servers in L. If one thinks this 
assumption not realistic, we can slightly modify the scheme as follows. For every possible set L, 
Pre-computation and communication phase is performed by the servers in L (rather than all 
servers). When L is specified by the data owner in Data reconstruction phase, servers use shares of 
random numbers and “0” for the specified L. The used shares must be discarded, but shares for other 
set 𝐿𝐿′(≠ 𝐿𝐿) need not to be discarded. The security of this modified protocol is proven in a similar 
6 
 
way to the above proof. Note that if the number of servers n is 2𝑡𝑡 + 1, we need not modify the 
scheme. 
